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China and Southeast Asia:
Unbalanced Development in the Greater Mekong Subregion
By Xiangming Chen & Curtis Stone
Integrating with Southeast Asia is a key component of 
China’s multi-pronged regionalisation around its borders as 
its global rise  continues. Below, Xiangming Chen and Curtis 
Stone consider the ambition of China’s ‘Go Southwest’ 
strategy to extend its economic interests and influence into 
Southeast Asia, and explore how China’s regional assertion 
reinforces the larger trend of new spatial configurations in 
light of increasing globalisation. The authors show how 
simultaneous globalisation and regionalisation unleashes 
a dual process of de-bordering and re-bordering where the 
traditional barrier role of borders is yielding more to that 
of bridges, as small, marginal, and remote border cities and 
towns become larger centers of trade and tourism. This 
article examines China’s effort to engage Southeast Asia 
and many of China’s footprints within and beyond the cities 
of the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS). Inter-country and 
intra-regional trade provides the starting point for examin-
ing the extent of economic integration in the GMS, and also 
its unbalanced development.
Going Southwest
In a coffee shop in central Vientiane on a hot summer day 
in 2012, two young Chinese businessmen from northwestern 
China, sipping ice-cold Latte, talked about the prospect of  
a new venture to explore copper in the mountains of  north-
ern Laos: ‘If  we make $100 and they [Laotians] get $5, they 
should be happy’. On the outskirts of  Yunnan’s capital city 
of  Kunming, China’s fourth largest airport behind Beijing, 
Shanghai, and Guangzhou (also the world’s fifth largest 
airport in occupied area), Changshui International Airport, 
which is expected to have flown 38 million passengers by 
2020 and 65 million by 2040,1 was opened with much 
fanfare in June 2012. While seemingly disparate, this pair of  
anecdotes reveals the ambition of  China’s ‘Go Southwest’ 
strategy to extend its economic interests and influence into 
Southeast Asia.
Integrating with Southeast Asia is a key component of  
China’s multi-pronged regionalisation around its borders 
as its global rise continues.2 China’s regional assertion rein-
forces a larger trend of  new spatial configuration as an inher-
ent part of  increasing globalisation driven by China. This 
simultaneous globalisation and regionalisation unleashes 
a dual process of  de-bordering and re-bordering where the 
traditional barrier role of  borders is yielding more to that 
of  bridges.3 As a result, once small, marginal, and remote 
border cities and towns have become larger and lively centers 
of  trade, tourism, and other flows. China’s effort to engage 
Southeast Asia leaves many striking footprints within and 
beyond the cities of  the Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
facilitated Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS), which 
was launched in 1992 and consists of  China’s Yunnan 
Province (with the later addition of  Guangxi Zhuang Auto-
nomous Region), Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, 
and Vietnam. 
Trade with the GMS Countries
Inter-country and intra-regional trade provides the start-
ing point for examining the extent of  economic integration 
in the GMS as well as its unbalanced development. China's 
trade with each of  the GMS countries has grown since 1990, 
most rapidly since 2000 (see Figure1, next page). Given the 
size of  their economies, Thailand, followed by Vietnam, led 
the smaller GMS countries in trade with China. However, 
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Unequal Power and Unba-
lanced Development
Despite the overall growth of  China-
Southeast Asia trade, China exerts a 
disproportionately strong influence on 
the GMS through a Yunnan-based and 
regionally oriented policy that proj-
ects development consequences over 
the borders.
On May 6, 2011, China’s State 
Council issued the important document 
entitled ‘Supporting the Accelerated 
Construction of  Yunnan as the 
Important Outpost for the Southwest 
Region’, which tasked the capital city 
of  Kunming to become the international 
hub for China’s southwestern region 
facing the GMS. Symbolically, Yunnan’s 
tallest building is rising in Kunming’s 
the total volume of  China-Myanmar 
trade rose by $5.9 billion from 2001 to 
2011, while China-Laos trade increased 
by $1.2 billion (Figure 1). Much of  
China’s growing trade with Myanmar 
and Laos occurred through cooperation 
across international boundaries. The 
role of  Yunnan and its capital city of  
Kunming in China-GMS trade cannot 
be understated. 
Yunnan's GDP skyrocketed from $33 
billion in 2000 to $160 billion in 2012, 
and the province aims to double that to 
$320 billion by 2017 through even stron-
ger cross-border economic and trade 
ties.4  Kunming acts as the origin and 
core of  economic activities that reach 
into the bordering countries of  Laos, 
Myanmar, Vietnam, and beyond.
Global Economy
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Figure 1. China’s Trade with Five GMS Countries, 1990-2011
Source: Data compiled from two sources.13
Panlong District, which will serve as the 
financial and commercial zone for the 
local presence and regional expansion 
of  multinational companies.
In implementing the ‘Kunming as an 
International Outpost’ strategy, Yunnan 
provincial and Kunming municipal gov-
ernments have introduced a variety of  
policies and projects. First, they are 
building a central Yunnan regional 
economic circle knitted together by 
the four cities of  Kunming, Qujing, 
Yuxi, and Chuxiong with Kunming as 
the core (see Map 1).5 In May 2012, 
Yunnan approved the establishment 
of  six border economic cooperation 
zones, including one around the city 
of  Tengchong (see Map 1). This pro-
vincial initiative augmented the central 
government’s approval of  opening three 
border economic cooperation zones 
in the cities of  Ruili, Wanding (under 
the jurisdiction of  Ruili but not con-
trolled by it), and Hekou (Map 1) in 
1992. Ruili and Hekou became the 
first and second largest border ports for 
Yunnan’s total foreign trade. Myanmar 
is Yunnan’s largest trading partner, 
and Ruili accounts for more than 30% 
of  the trade with Myanmar and more 
than 60% of  the province's trade with 
Myanmar.6
To complement the spatial planning 
of  new city-regions and lively border 
trade, Yunnan has created new institu-
tional and cultural ties to the GMS coun-
tries. It has recently set up commercial 
representative offices in Singapore and 
Cambodia and is planning to expand 
the number of  Confucius Institutes and 
Chinese language centers already oper-
ating in the GMS countries to increase 
China’s soft power. It has trained a 
growing number of  specialists who can 
speak Thai, Burmese, and Vietnamese. 
The number of  international students in 
Yunnan rose from 760 in 2001 to 10,000 
in 2007 and to over 20,000 in 2011, with 
about 80% of  them having come primar-
ily from Southeast Asia.7
The Myanmar border towns of  
Muse and Namhkam have done well by 
importing Chinese goods such as gar-
ments and consumer electronics, which 
Despite the overall growth of China-Southeast Asia trade, 
China exerts a disproportionately strong influence on the 
GMS through a Yunnan-based and regionally oriented policy.
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occupy as much as 80-90% of  the local markets in northern 
Myanmar. In Lashio, a remote but important market town 
195 kilometres from Mandalay in northern Shan State, many 
trucks loaded with Chinese consumer goods rolled through 
the town and onto the booming city of  Mandalay. The popu-
lation of  Lashio is about 50% Chinese, while Mandalay, the 
seat of  Myanmar’s culture, is one-fifth Yunnanese Chinese. 
This Chinese ‘on the ground’ influence helps pave the way for 
China’s (and also Yunnan’s) new ambitious outlook for access-
ing the Indian Ocean over the Lashio--Mandalay land route.
Back to Yunnan’s border city of  Ruili, which has a highly 
mobile migrant population, the China-Myanmar nexus goes 
both ways, with Myanmar’s local presence becoming stronger. 
According to official statistics, an estimated 30,000 Myanmar 
people either come through the border daily or take up long-
term presence in Ruili. This is roughly equivalent to 17% of  
the city’s total population of  180,627 in 2012, but this esti-
mated figure only includes those who legally cross the porous 
and at times seemingly nonexistent border. On a recent day, 
we talked with two young Myanmese women from Muse 
working in two different bookstores in Ruili. Both of  them 
are of  Chinese descent, and both are happy to commute every 
day across one of  the three checkpoints to work in China. 
At the same time, many from Myanmar have become more 
settled residents in Ruili and formed a distinctive local com-
munity, with its own grocery stores, coffee shops, hair salons, 
and long-distance telephone service. Most of  the Myanmese 
men we spoke to are engaged in the jade trade. China even 
provides electricity and mobile phone service to Muse, allow-
ing the Myanmese in Ruili to phone their family and relatives 
in Muse as local calls. 
Connecting and Powering for Development
To facilitate and scale up trade along and beyond China’s 
combined long border with Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, 
China has been extending its tentacles of  transport infra-
structure to the GMS in multiple directions (see Map 2 on 
next page). China has reached an agreement with Myanmar 
to construct a rail link between Myanmar's Chinese border 
and its western coast. The railroad will run from the Shan 
State’s border town of  Muse and span 800 kilometres across 
the country to Rakhine State's port city of  Kyaukphyu on 
the Bay of  Bengal. The whole project is projected to take 
five years and is estimated to cost about $20 billion, and 
it will be borne by China based on BOT (build, operate, 
and transfer) for 50 years. Once completed, the railroad will 
allow electric trains to travel at speeds of  up to 200 kilome-
tres per hour and carry 4,000 tons of  goods. Strategically, 
this railroad will carry China’s imports and exports to and 
from the port of  Kyaukphyu on the Indian Ocean via Ruili 
and Kunming, obviating the need for ships to sail through 
the narrow Malacca Strait.8
Pushed by China, the Lao government has recently 
approved China’s offer to build a cross-border railroad to 
connect the capital Vientiane to Luang Namtha Province 
along the border with China, with a further extension to 
Kunming and a total length of  420 kilometres. The China-
Vientiane railroad project, which is scheduled to be completed 
by 2018, will require the construction of  76 tunnels and 154 
bridges. The projected cost will be over $7 billion. China has 
offered to extend a massive loan of  $7.2 billion through its 
Import-Export Bank to Laos. Originally agreed upon as a 
China-Laos joint venture, the railroad ran into opposition for 
requiring Laos to hand over vast tracts of  land to the Chinese 
contractor. The project is now going to be wholly owned by 
the Lao government. Being landlocked, Laos is willing to 
make major concessions to its powerful neighbor in the north 
in an effort to turn itself  into a country that is ‘land-linked’ 
with railroads.
China has also intensified its varied efforts to secure 
the rich natural resources in the region. It has stirred con-
troversy in generating more hydropower by building a 
number of  dams on the Lancang River in Yunnan, which 
forms the upper reaches of  the Mekong River (see Map 2 
on next page). Of  the four dams already in operation and 
the Nuozhadu Dam to be completed in 2014, the Xiaowan 
and Nuozhadu dams, with 9,800 and 12,400 million cubic 
metres of  active storage, can redistribute a significant 
Map 1. Yunnan Province and Its City Circles and 
Border Economic Zones
Source: Modified from a map located at  
http://www.traveltibetguide.com/Trip_Overland_from_Yunnan_to_Tibet_tour.html/.
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To facilitate and scale up trade along and 
beyond China’s combined long border with 
Myanmar, Laos, and Vietnam, China has 
been extending its tentacles of transport.
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A Region on the Move
As China’s economic reach grows spatially through the GMS, 
it has also begun to stretch its sphere of  political influence. 
After losing a dozen sailors on a freight boat plying the Mekong 
River, China pushed Thailand, Myanmar, and Laos to help 
hunt down a notorious drug lord who had been alleged to be 
the mastermind behind the Mekong massacre. China worked 
closely with Myanmar and Lao police to capture Naw Kham, 
a Myanmar citizen, in northern Laos, and then extradited him 
to China where he was paraded live on television and then exe-
cuted by lethal injection in March 2013.11 The China-Myanmar 
oil and gas pipeline, which starts at Kyaukpyu port on the west 
coast of  Myanmar and enters China at the city of  Ruili, has 
run into some resistance by local farmers in northern Myanmar 
living near its route, and the concerns of  an increasingly skep-
tical Myanmese public wary of  China's growing dominance 
were further heightened at the end of  July when the natural 
gas pipeline started to deliver gas to China, but it is expected to 
be complete and fully operational later this year. This project is 
amount of  water from the wet to the dry season and reduce 
sediment transport in the Mekong mainstream.9 The redis-
tribution of  water can help balance the water levels between 
Mekong’s segments located in different countries. But the 
dams on the upper Mekong could damage the migratory 
fish stocks, which provide 40-80% of  animal protein in 
local diets to the approximately 70 million people living 
within its watershed.10
China is actually not alone in damming the Mekong. Laos 
stands out among the other GMS countries in maximising 
its abundant water resources from the Mekong to speed up 
development by selling hydropower to Thailand and China, 
which controls 32% of  Laos’ hydropower projects. However, 
the huge environmental impact of  such projects has worried 
Laos and pressured it to suspend its most controversial pro-
posal to build the $3.8-billion Xayaburi Dam (Map 2). The 
GMS countries will continue to face the challenge in recon-
ciling their competing development goals and interests bound 
together by a long international river.
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Map 2. The Growing Transport Network (China-Myanmar gas-oil pipeline) and Dams in the Greater Mekong Subregion
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China has also intensified its varied efforts to secure the rich natural resources in the region. 
It has stirred controversy in generating more hydropower by building a number of dams on 
the Lancang River in Yunnan, which forms the upper reaches of the Mekong River.
Global Economy
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designed to transport 22 million tons of  crude oil and 12 billion 
cubic meters of  gas per year from Myanmar’s west coast to 
Kunming for processing by a new large refinery. This in turn 
will provide much needed energy for China’s southwestern 
development that will spread even more across the borders.
Some recent developments south of  Yunnan may counter 
or offset China’s influence as Southeast Asia itself  also contin-
ues to integrate. The ADB has provided a total of  $220 million 
to strengthen small cities in Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam 
along the East-West Economic Corridor, allowing female street 
vendors in three small cities to have access to a micro-finance 
project worth $2.5 million in non-refundable aid from the Japan 
Fund for Poverty Reduction. Higher labor and land costs in 
China than in Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, and even Vietnam 
have already driven some of  the most labor-intensive industries 
(i.e. shoes and garments) to Southeast Asia. In 2012, Cambodia 
received more foreign investment per person than China for 
the first time since the 1970s.12 Laos has built the Savan-Seno 
Special Economic Zone in Savannakhet City to attract more 
labor-intensive manufacturing by connecting Thailand to China 
and Thailand to Vietnam, trying to catch up to and learn from 
China’s experience and trajectory of  development.
The GMS countries will continue to perform well, with 
or without China’s investment, due to extensive economic 
and spatial ties as well as cultural ties with its northern 
neighbor. It is up to all six member countries of  the GMS 
and not just China to determine how both regions can 
compete and yet cooperate to achieve greater sustainable 
development. If  a healthy relationship between China and 
the GMS can be not just maintained, but deepened, the 
economic and political landscape of  the Mekong Region 
will be forever reshaped. 
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It is up to all six member countries of the 
GMS to determine how both regions can 
compete and yet cooperate to achieve 
greater sustainable development. 
